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“Conscience Exemptions,” and the Racism Analogy: 
A Reply to Professor Koppelman 
Shannon Gilreath* 
Nothing short of everything will really do. 
—Aldous Huxley1 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, I published an article, Same-Sex Marriage, Religious 
Accommodation, and the Race Analogy (hereinafter Race Analogy),2 in 
which I painstakingly explained the “racism analogy” at which 
Professor Koppelman directs his lecture. Our approaches to the 
subject differ in critical ways, some of which Professor Koppelman 
highlights in his response to my work.3 The primary purpose of my 
earlier Race Analogy piece was to debunk the myth perpetrated by 
	
 *  © 2019, Shannon Gilreath. Professor of Law and Professor of Women’s, Gender, 
and Sexuality Studies, Wake Forest University. I sincerely thank Professor Andrew Koppelman 
and the BYU Law Review for this invitation. 
 1.  ALDOUS HUXLEY, ISLAND 160 (1962). 
 2.  Shannon Gilreath & Arley Ward, Same-Sex Marriage, Religious Accommodation, and 
the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV. 237 (2016). 
 3.  See Andrew Koppelman, Lecture at the Brigham Young University Law School 
Annual Law and Religion Symposium: Gay Rights, Religious Liberty, and the Misleading Racism 
Analogy (Sept. 18, 2019), in 2020 BYU L. REV.  1, 21 [hereinafter Koppelman Lecture]. 
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some scholars that religious opposition to same-sex marriage 
was somehow unique in our history and, therefore, that the law 
was bound to respond to a unique problem in unique ways.4 Since 
even a cursory familiarity with civil rights history proves this 
untrue, I felt it was necessary to provide some facts. 
But it was an article I resisted writing for a very long time. I 
don’t like the analogy of sexuality discrimination to race discrim-
ination. I don’t like appropriating the pain and struggle of others to 
make a point. And I shouldn’t have to. Why should my discrim-
ination have to be like some other discrimination in order to be seen 
as real and really injurious? Can’t gay people matter simply for 
who we are and what we face? Why should any marginalized 
people be forced to play the oppression sweepstakes in order to 
make any progress? Similarly, the reverse argument—the 
“homophobia is wrong, but it’s not as bad racism” argument—is 
little more than an evasion. At its worst, it’s a direct guilt ploy. “If 
you haven’t had it as bad as they did,” the argument goes, “what’s 
the fuss about? Be grateful.” Professor Koppelman gives us a bit of 
this argument in his lecture. 
Thus, being aware of the gamut, my point in Race Analogy was 
never to suggest that race discrimination and sexuality discrim-
ination are exactly the same, but merely that, in a legal system that 
proceeds by analogy, history and precedent cannot be ignored 
simply because they are inconvenient for the pro–conscience 
exemption advocates. Professor Koppelman is one of the scholars 
whose work I criticized sharply in that article, particularly his 
scholarship on a Title II defense of anti-gay discrimination5 in the 
form of so-called conscience exemptions. To my great surprise, he 
wrote me a friendly letter about the piece, not agreeing with all, of 
course, but acknowledging the importance of the work just the 
	
 4.  Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 244–48. 
 5.  Id. at 256–47 (critiquing Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, 
and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619 (2015)). I realize Professor 
Koppelman has been “a gay rights advocate for thirty years.” Koppelman Lecture, supra note 
3, at 30.  I do not dispute his bona fides in this regard.  However, what he is defending in the 
context of antidiscrimination exemptions is discrimination.  It is simply a form of 
discrimination that he finds tolerable.  From his perspective, it is, I suppose, only “tepidly” 
anti-gay, to use Judge Richard Posner’s miserable coinage. See Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian 
Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008).  There is and will be no real equality 
for gay Americans until straight people no longer find it excusable to ask gay people to bear 
forms of discrimination straight people find tolerable.  There is and will be no equality if it 
is not substantive and, dare I say, total in this way.  That is the goal of my gay rights advocacy. 
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same.6 In fact, as a matter of full disclosure, I have seen some of 
Professor Koppelman’s ideas presented in this Special Issue before, 
since he asked me to review them in an earlier draft form as part of 
a larger project. While I still cannot say that I agree with his 
perspective, I greatly admire his magnanimity in the face of pointed 
criticism. In an area of scholarship and activism where the players 
are notoriously thin-skinned, his response was fresh and welcome. 
I must say, however, that I was surprised to see that the draft of 
his lecture provided to me does not really engage the legal 
argument presented by my Race Analogy piece to any appreciable 
degree. Unfortunately, Professor Koppelman’s lecture reads instead 
as a string of hitched-together non sequiturs comprising a mean-
dering essay on philosophical questions of “evil” and what he sees 
as malicious religious intolerance and poor sportsmanship on the 
part of gay people.  The lecture does not read as a serious rejoinder 
to arguments about the purposes for and operation of 
antidiscrimination law. 
The race analogy that has always concerned me is the legal 
analogy—the one I carefully researched and developed in my Race 
Analogy piece, focusing on the historical and legal anti-equality 
consequences of race-based and sexuality-based discrimination 
and the antidiscrimination law responses that have been developed 
and are still developing. Consequently, for the most thorough 
rebuttal I know of to Professor Koppelman’s argument here, I can 
do no better than to direct readers of this Special Issue to my earlier 
Race Analogy article.7 
I will confine my succeeding comments, in what was supposed 
to be a short piece, primarily to Professor Koppelman’s direct 
engagement with my earlier work. I will first address the 
appropriate framing of the issue at hand, then move on to the 
purposes of antidiscrimination law, and, finally, offer some thoughts 
on what appears to be Professor Koppelman’s overriding 
concern—namely, his fear that religionists will be unfairly 
	
 6.  Email from Andrew Koppelman, Professor of Law and Professor of Political 
Science, Department of Philosophy Affiliated Faculty, at Northwestern University, to 
Shannon Gilreath (Dec. 6, 2018) (on file with author). 
 7.  In Race Analogy, I also outline the powerful legal argument that the kind of opt-
outs Koppelman supports are unconstitutional as a matter of both equal protection and 
substantive due process. That is a critical piece of the debate that should not be missed. See 
Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 268–78. 
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stereotyped as bigoted or “evil” if they refuse goods and services 
to gay people. 
I. DEFINITIONS AND FRAMING 
First, I must say a word on language and definition. Language 
can be deployed in ways that unfairly inflate stakes and obfuscate 
intentions. We live in a cultural and political moment when 
language has become even more Orwellian than Orwell could have 
imagined. Language is co-opted, often disingenuously and cynically, 
for political advantage. Anti-reproductive rights forces are now 
marshalled under the banner of “pro-life.” Illegal immigrants are 
now merely “undocumented persons.” The list gets longer, and 
inscrutably, for me anyhow, the public seems to roll over to this 
capture, accepting without much resistance other people’s labels 
and framing. 
I have this problem with the way Professor Koppelman frames 
the subject. Professor Koppelman asks: “Should religious people 
who conscientiously object to facilitating same-sex weddings, and 
who therefore decline to provide cakes . . . or other services, be 
exempted from antidiscrimination laws?”8 “Facilitating” is vocab-
ulary loaded to the point of breakage. Now, even though Professor 
Koppelman later elides (without convincing argument) analogy 
between interracial marriage and same-sex marriage, let’s look at 
the same moment of discrimination through this lens. Let’s imagine 
that an interracial couple, black and white, shows up to the same 
bakery for a wedding cake. Let’s imagine that the baker says, “I 
refuse your patronage not for any racist motive [i.e., not exactly on 
the basis of your race as an individual customer], but rather because 
I view selling you a cake to be ‘facilitating’ the separate sin of your 
interracial marriage.” It isn’t hard to see the race-based discrimination 
at work, even though we are asked to ignore the fact that this 
separate “sin” of interracial marriage is itself predicated on the race 
of those involved, such that race is acting in exactly the invidious 
role we have agreed as a society (either nationally or at a more local 
level) that the law ought to prohibit. In other words, but for the race 
of those presented, the service would not be denied.9 That is race-
	
 8.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 1 (emphasis added). 
 9.  It must be noted at this juncture that the absurd distinction between individuals 
subjected to obvious discrimination and the defense of that discrimination as merely against 
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based discrimination simpliciter. The substitution of sexuality for 
race in this scenario raises no respectable difference grounded in 
legal principle. The only difference is one insisted on by Professor 
Koppelman for reasons reducible to, “Because I say so.”10 
Now, let’s drill down a bit further. Can we take “facilitating” 
seriously at all in the context of the provision of a general 
commercial service? For example, let’s imagine that Professor 
Koppelman and I continue to be friendly acquaintances even after 
a continued airing of our disagreements. (I hope so.) Let’s imagine 
that I decide to buy a cake for him on his next birthday. I go down 
to my local bakery and ask Marge behind the counter to sell me a 
cake and write “Happy Birthday, Andy!” on it. I present the cake 
to Professor Koppelman. Do any of us really expect Professor 
Koppelman to rush down to the bakery and thank Marge for the 
birthday wishes? Of course not. And that is because we recognize 
immediately that Marge has nothing whatever to do with the cake’s 
message or the celebration of which it is a part. 
In this light, the “facilitation” happens exclusively in the head 
of the offended service provider. It is far less serious than the 
conscience objection claimed by clerks who do not want to issue 
marriage licenses. A clerk offended by the “sinful” actions of those 
who present for a license can at least claim with a straight face that 
his signature on that license effectively facilitates (i.e. permits or 
enables) the marriage. But I have argued that an exemption even as 
narrow as this is misguided policy and unconstitutional law. 
Professor Koppelman argues for exemptions far wider than this, 
encompassing even the general stream of commerce. 
In the system advocated for by Koppelman, the law is supposed 
to accept the discriminator’s definition of facilitation, ignoring that 
the same commercial act only becomes “facilitation” when the 
provider realizes the sexual orientation of the customer. In other 
words, the discrimination is propagandized as only tepid, some-
how less discriminatory, because it is focused on the act of the 
	
the actions of those targeted is supremely ridiculous. After all, this was the distinction upon 
which all of Jim Crow was predicated.  See Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 245–51. 
 10.  Professor Koppelman truly makes no case. His lecture is full of non sequiturs like 
this: “Racism remains a powerful force in American culture and politics. A zero tolerance 
response is appropriate . . . [but] it is not necessary for the tension between gay rights and 
the rights of religious liberty to be addressed at the level of high principle.” Koppelman 
Lecture, supra note 3, at 19 (footnote omitted). 
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marriage, not, so it is argued, on the identity of the customer. But 
that is plainly not the case, since the discrimination is predicated on 
the individual reality of the customer and perpetrated against 
individuals. 
It must be noted at this juncture that the distinction between 
individuals subjected to obvious discrimination and the defense of 
that discrimination as merely against the actions of those targeted 
is supremely ridiculous. After all, this was the distinction upon 
which all of Jim Crow was predicated. It was the act of integration—
the act of dining together, attending school together, being 
transported together, and so on—that the laws prohibited. Nowhere 
is this plainer than in the state of Virginia’s defense of its  
anti-miscegenation law, which was declared unconstitutional in 
Loving v. Virginia.11 In Loving, the state argued that no prohibited 
racial discrimination was occurring, since the law focused only on 
the prevention of the act of interracial marriage equally for 
everyone—the prevention of which was actually good for the 
integrity of all races.12 The fact that echoes of this logic persist in 
gay rights scholarship in the twenty-first century does give one a 
shiver. Mercifully, the Court saw through it. The Court ultimately 
did not share Professor Koppelman’s fixation on good or bad 
motives for discrimination.13 
These observations lead me to consider Professor Koppelman’s 
primary frame, that of “religious liberty.” His is a conception of 
religious liberty that I cannot endorse. Religious liberty is about the 
safeguarding of religious belief and its attendant religious 
celebration. Any man may worship the god he chooses in any 
religious ceremony he chooses. The government may not punish 
him for that, nor by extension should non-governmental 
employers, landlords, etc., punish him. But the view of religious 
liberty Professor Koppelman endorses is an extreme version. It 
insists that religionists must not only go unmolested for their 
beliefs but that they are also entitled to molest others through 
invocation of their religion—all while shielded by the law. What 
	
 11.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967). 
 12.  There are those who would argue that the state was insincere. That’s probably 
true. But I am no more prepared to take religionists claiming exemptions at their word than 
the Court was to take the state of Virginia at its word. I am not qualified to assess the 
operation of any man’s mind in this way. Far better to let antidiscrimination law do its job. 
 13.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
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could possibly go wrong in this scenario? In context, “religious 
liberty” is deployed to mask a call for special rights for religionists. 
They must be allowed to violate the law as their conscience guides 
them. This is certainly not a view of religious liberty endorsed by 
the Court.14 And even though the Court left open the possibility of 
the grant of exemptions in certain situations, those exemptions 
must still—must always—pass constitutional muster.15 As I have 
argued earlier, the kind of special discrimination rights Koppelman 
endorses as “conscience exemptions” cannot survive constitutional 
challenge.16 
II. DISCRIMINATION: THE REAL AND THE UNREAL 
I must admit that I found Koppelman’s description (implicitly 
so, at the least) of anti-gay religion as “fantasy” rather delicious.17 
But a fantasy and discrimination on account of it are two 
fundamentally different things. A fantasy stops in your head. I’m 
not interested in policing people’s thoughts or beliefs. I’m not 
interested in “evil” as a philosophical concept in the way Koppelman 
presents it. I’ll leave that to the philosophers and preachers. 
I’m a lawyer. I’m interested in rights and discrimination in the 
context of the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to equality. I 
don’t care at all what people believe, what they think of gay people, 
or, certainly, whether they like me. I only care when they attempt 
to diminish the equal citizenship to which I am entitled by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s constitutional commitment to equality, 
which is every bit as real as the First Amendment’s commitment to 
free exercise of religion, and which also may be safeguarded by 
state and local laws created in that same spirit. 
But the injury religious people claim they face by having to 
engage abstractly in commerce with the concept of same-sex 
marriage really is a fantasy—an injury that stops in their heads and 
does not take from them any material benefit or opportunity. The 
injury they claim is the equivalent of someone saying, “I believe I 
am Batman, and I refuse to engage with anyone who might challenge 
my belief that I am Batman.” They have experienced no material 
	
 14.  See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 15.  See Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 268–78. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 15. 
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costs—no lost services or opportunities. What separates discrimi-
nation in the real world from the delusions in one man’s head is the 
presence of these costs. Once invidious prejudice is allowed to 
operate in reality and someone else is made to pay for the prejudicial 
fantasies of another, whatever the origins or sincerity of those 
prejudices, material discrimination is at work. This is the concern 
of antidiscrimination law. 
To this basic and unavoidable legal reality, Professor 
Koppelman has an answer that itself can only be described as 
fantastical. To my earlier argument that refusing to cover a 
historically marginalized group like gay people from commercial 
discrimination would make gay people “a legal underclass that can 
be deprived of all manner of services and accommodations under 
the imprimatur of the state,”18 Koppelman responds that “[a]ll 
citizens . . . are already in this ‘underclass,’ unless the deprivation 
is based on a forbidden category of discrimination.”19 Setting aside 
for a moment the obvious, which is that the kind of special 
discrimination exemptions Koppelman advocates would be needed 
only in a jurisdiction that has forbidden discrimination on account of 
sexual orientation, the statement is still fanciful—made only more 
so by the explanation he provides. “Merchants,” he writes, “can 
even turn away African-Americans, so long as they don’t do so on 
the basis of race. They can, for example, demand identification and 
then reject anyone, black or white, who was born in August.”20 This 
is a law school hypothetical worthy of Lewis Carroll. What’s little 
is big; what’s short is tall; what’s unreal is real. But anti-
discrimination law must operate in reality, not fiction. To say that 
all citizens are already in the underclass is entirely hyperbolic in the 
context of a serious discussion of discrimination. The argument 
about “at will” employment, in which Professor Koppelman 
claims everyone is already in an underclass,21 may make sense in a 
world where the risks to people born in August or people who 
refuse to indulge their delusional neighbors in their belief that they 
are Batman are diffused—spread across a huge population of 
people. But that is not what’s happening. Nobody is turning away 
African Americans from potential employment because they 
	
 18.  Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 277. 
 19.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 22. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
002.GILREATH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:54 AM 
33 The Racism Analogy 
	 41 
	
happen to be born in August. They are, however, turning away 
gays from employment, from goods and services, from housing, 
and from medical care (and many would turn away blacks, too, if 
the law didn’t prohibit it). Transforming real discrimination into 
fiction doesn’t help reduce the real opportunity costs that gay 
Americans face for no other reason than that they are gay.22 
As for Koppelman’s belief that “market incentives” are workable 
alternatives to antidiscrimination law in most, if not all, 
situations23—what one might call the “trickle-down theory” of civil 
rights—I must say that it proceeds from a certain privileged vantage 
point. The irony is not lost on me that legal antidiscrimination 
protections for gays most often exist in places where they are, 
relatively speaking, least needed. But in the South, where I grew up 
and still live, the possibility that all or nearly all providers of a good 
or service in a particular locale would refuse to provide the good or 
service to gays is not hypothetical. It is real. The “occasional” 
discriminatory baker or florist is every, or nearly every, baker or 
florist. For me, gays and their constitutional right to equality matter 
everywhere. James Baldwin understood that environment is of 
paramount importance.  It is why he felt he had to go the belly of 
the beast—the South—in order really to understand segregation.24 
This is reality for gay people, not merely a convenient rhetorical 
device on my part. Moreover, as I have said, “any system of 
subordination exists and subsists by rendering the inferior depen-
dent upon the superior.”25 In other words, as long as gay people 
must negotiate something less than a constitutional entitlement to 
equality (and must do so on straight people’s terms) there will be 
no real equality. After all, if the people now demanding the right to 
affirmatively discriminate against gays and lesbians in the general 
stream of commerce had any intention of adhering to the Great 
	
 22.  Professor Koppelman here acknowledges that there are some forbidden categories 
of discrimination, including race. He does not go far at all in explaining why discrimination 
on account of an innate characteristic like sexual orientation is, in his view, more like birth-
date discrimination than it is race-based discrimination. 
 23.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 22. 
 24.  JAMES BALDWIN, No Name in the Street, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: COLLECTED 
NONFICTION 1948–1985, at 449, 476–81 (1985). 
 25.  Shannon Gilreath, Not a Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 
U. ILL. L. REV. 205, 220 (book review). 
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Commandment26 without the force of law, there would be no 
reason for us to be having this debate. 
Professor Koppelman’s and my root disagreement comes from 
a fundamental difference in opinion about what’s really at stake. 
He sees antidiscrimination laws as correcting or ameliorating 
individual episodes of discrimination. On the other hand, I see 
them as guarding against the systematic oppression of people, in 
ways large and small, based on their assignment to an othered caste 
that always makes of them an experimentation ground for new 
forms of oppressive conduct that render them materially (not 
merely theoretically) unequal. The fact that some gays might escape 
the caste makes it no less real, no less oppressive, and, yes, in 
circumstances far more numerous than are ever admitted, no less 
lethal. Of course, I do not believe, and have never suggested, that 
religion should never be accommodated. For example, I’ve always 
thought the Catholic adoption agency cases27 were wrongly decided. 
Where churches themselves (or their other non-profit iterations) are 
performing a service, I think they should be able to do so in 
complete adherence to their stated religious preferences.28 But 
extending this license to any individual in the general stream of 
commerce (or representative of the state, which I discuss in my Race 
Analogy article) makes religious exercise a constitutional super value, 
	
 26.  See Mark 12:28–34. This commandment is often paraphrased in English with the 
“Golden Rule” of “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.” 
 27.  See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 28.  A student editor from this law review asked me a very perceptive question about 
this statement.  Why, he wanted to know, would allowing churches to discriminate not also 
produce the kinds of aggregate effects I am concerned with in this essay?  Is it because there 
are too few churches, too few services being performed, or just that services outside the 
stream of commerce are less problematic?  All of his observations on the point are correct.  
There would be aggregate inequality. It would be tempered in scale. But, beyond this, I also 
believe that a balance must be struck where churches are concerned because it is simply 
inconceivable to me that a church performing a charitable function that is not-for-profit in 
any real sense is not exercising religion in a way that must be covered by the First 
Amendment’s free exercise commitment.  Gore Vidal once told me he thought the Framers 
had wanted “God thrown out the window” in Philadelphia.  I don’t share his certainty on 
that point, but I don’t mind saying that I think the country may have been better off 
ultimately if he were right.  Nevertheless, the First Amendment does protect free exercise of 
religion.  While I think it is an unsupportable stretch to say that the Founding concern over 
religious persecution would cover such quotidian commercial transactions as the sale of a 
cake, I can’t see my way to a position that would deny a church the ability to do charity work 
on its own doctrinal terms (however uncharitable I might find the behavior personally). 
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which my reading of the Constitution, particularly its commitment 
to equal protection, does not permit. 
III.  THE BANALITY OF KOPPELMAN’S “EVIL”  
(WITH APOLOGIES TO ARENDT29) 
Professor Koppelman is concerned with “evil,” especially with 
the idea that those who mistreat (or worse?) gay people may be 
labeled evil. A chief complaint he lodges against me is one to which 
I will not accede, namely that I think “[r]eligion is the enemy and 
must be fought at every turn.”30 A fair portion of my youth was 
spent as a Southern Baptist. In my teens, I converted to Roman 
Catholicism. I have loved people of many faiths and experienced 
their love of their neighbor reflected in many kindnesses to me. I 
certainly do not see all religious people as “hateful demons”31 or 
“unchangeably evil.”32 For one thing, it is not my right nor my 
expertise to make such pronouncements. For another, you don’t do 
the work I have done for nearly two decades without an abiding 
and optimistic belief that people can change. 
Now, admittedly, a religion of exclusion may be far from my 
idea of what makes an ethical spirituality or an ethical life; after all, 
the sacred requirements to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, and 
visit those in prison must seem monumentally difficult, if not 
impossible, for those whose faith can be punctured by the sale of a 
cake. In the event, “as ye have done it unto one of the least of these 
my brethren, ye have done it to me,”33 must prove the equivalent of 
a spiritual interrogation light under which to make that call. But the 
spiritual dimension of that choice is between them and their god, 
and I am content to leave it there. I am not interested in making 
moralistic judgments about the good or ill of their motives, as 
Koppelman is.34 Such a judgment is unfair, for it calls for an 
understanding of the operation of another man’s mind in a way 
	
 29.  HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 
(1963). 
 30.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 23. 
 31.  Id. at 15. 
 32.  Id. 
 33. Matthew 25:40. 
 34.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 9–17. 
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that I (nor anyone) is qualified to make.35 Rather, I am interested in 
material outcomes in the real world—the business of the law. 
Countee Cullen wrote that, “My conversion came high-priced / I 
belong to Jesus Christ.”36 I may not always sing the “Amen,” but 
the only thing I’m interested in resisting is when the converted 
demand that others pay the high price for their faith. On that 
demand have history’s injustices, too innumerable to be named, too 
often been predicated. 
Relatedly, Professor Koppelman seems to think that I have said 
that all religious people mean to do gay people violence.37 I never 
said that. I took issue with the fact that Professor Koppelman has 
said that people who perpetrate physical violence against gay people 
“are not motivated by moral objections to [gay people’s] conduct.”38 
To this wholly unsupported claim, I simply inquired as to exactly 
how many such perpetrators he’s interviewed. How would he know? 
While I could cite many examples of anti-gay abuse in which 
perpetrators have directly invoked religious inspiration, this is still 
far from a claim that all religious people mean to do me harm or 
support it. Koppelman is attacking an argument I have never made. 
What I said was much more realistic (and, perhaps, therefore, 
necessary to elide): “When religious ethos brands gays as 
untouchable, unnatural, and abominable, the fact that they can be 
harmed with impunity should be no surprise.”39 Like any monster 
(Koppelman’s verbiage, not mine40), the monster of homophobia 
cannot necessarily be contained by its creator—it takes on a life of 
its own. But surely no one is naïve or dishonest enough to claim 
that homophobia as we know it now would exist without religion’s 
“thou shalt not.”41 This connection might be easier to miss for 
	
 35.  I am, moreover, indifferent to the question.  Relatedly, I don’t care, as Koppelman 
seems to, whether anti-gay religious believers are using their religion as a “cover” for 
something else—”something nasty.” Koppelman lecture, supra note 3, at 4. I am by no 
measure politically correct. I have no problem condemning an abusive religious practice as 
nasty in itself. I don’t need a proxy. Be that as it may, I also firmly believe that people have a 
right in this country to hold whatever odious and indefensible beliefs they like, and they can 
call them whatever they like. My objection as a lawyer and legal scholar comes when they 
insist that the rest of us pay public prices for those beliefs. 
 36.  Countee Cullen, Heritage, THE SURVEY (Mar. 1, 1925), at 674–75. 
 37.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 22–23. 
 38.  Id. at 22 (quoting Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 257). 
 39.  Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 257. 
 40.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 21. 
 41.  Leviticus 18:22. 
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someone who can write that my argument “overstates the role of 
religion, and understates the role of masculine gender anxiety, in 
the violence that does take place,”42 obviously failing to notice that 
said religion is patriarchal to the core and gendered to the ground. 
Real life simply isn’t divisible into religion in one box and all conse-
quences in another box. Nor is it possible to pretend that a “few 
dissenters” who are “conservative Christian wedding vendors” 
“just want to be left alone.”43 Even if they do aspire only to that, 
they do not exist in a vacuum. Discrimination is not merely 
arithmetic. Every “thug” who beats up gay people may not do so 
for consciously religious reasons, but the act is never truly divorced 
from its social context. Antigay acts don’t happen in a vacuum. 
A cultural context in which gays can successfully be branded 
“other,” inarguably usually as a result of a root religious ethos, 
creates the environment that cossets killers. This simply is true, 
whether or not any particular killer kills in God’s name. So, if there 
is a trope that all religious conservatives yearn to do physical 
violence against gays, it certainly isn’t my trope. But it’s also a 
delusion—a uniquely American delusion—that antigay rhetoric 
and propaganda, usually couched as defensible religious morality, 
isn’t related to the ultimately very real physical perils still faced in 
this country by gays and lesbians. Such a supposition is no more 
believable for me than was the ACLU’s position that the ethos 
created by preachers claiming that abortion doctors are murderers 
killing God’s precious babies and, therefore, that these doctors do 
not deserve life themselves wasn’t related—in a causal way—to the 
abortion clinic bombings that plagued the nation not so long ago.44 
Context matters. 
Quite obvious to anyone who studies the history of marginalized 
people and the links between social obloquy and violence is that a 
public campaign of systematic stigma and dehumanization of a 
targeted minority enables killers.45 Such a social reality must be 
fought at every turn. It must be opposed. If Koppelman sees that as 
	
 42.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 23. 
 43.  Id. at 2, 25. 
 44.  Trial to Decide if Anti-Choice Site, Posters Constitute Threat to Doctors, ACLU  
(Jan. 8, 1999), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/trial-decide-if-anti-choice-site-posters-
constitute-threat-doctors. 
 45.  I have examined this stigma and its effects at length elsewhere. See SHANNON 
GILREATH, THE END OF STRAIGHT SUPREMACY: REALIZING GAY LIBERATION 111–68 (2011). 
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coterminous with a condemnation of all religion, that’s on him. It 
doesn’t matter, as Koppelman seems to think it does, that most 
religious people who believe homosexuality is sinful won’t answer 
a survey saying they also believe gay people should be killed 
because of it.46 Returning to the race analogy at hand, it’s 
unfathomable to believe that all whites (if they had been) surveyed 
during Jim Crow would have said blacks should have been subjected 
to violence with impunity (at least, if they stayed in line), but the 
system of social apartheid and inhumanity enshrined in a legal 
system that allowed unequal treatment certainly made the violence 
possible and real. That’s indisputable.47 
Again, I understand that this all may be hard to see for someone 
like Koppelman, who can write: 
Discrimination and violence—open, unapologetic, hateful—have 
been part of their [gay] experience since adolescence. If you are 
subjected to enough of that stuff, you are going to see the danger 
of it everywhere. It is hard to get your mind around the fact that 
the vicious monster who abused you is now in hospice care.48 
Would that it were. But as I showed in response to that 2015 
statement by Professor Koppelman,49 which appears in his Brigham 
Young lecture unaltered,50 material reality gives the lie to his 
conclusion. At the time Koppelman first made the statement, gay 
people were—in that moment—accounting for two in every five 
bias-related murders in the United States.51 Think about that. Gay 
people are, by the way, only about four percent of the population. 
Twenty percent of all hate crimes committed in the United States 
had us as the target.52 That number hasn’t changed much from last 
reporting according to the FBI’s most recently released report for 
2018.53 And, yet, somehow, Koppelman can write, apropos of 
	
 46.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 23. 
 47.  Koppelman admits this. “Violence was integral to the system that religious racists 
sought to defend.” Id. 
 48.  See Koppelman, supra note 5, at 648–49. I objected to this gross overstatement 
vigorously with evidence of its fallacy. See Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 256–58. 
 49.  See Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 256–58. 
 50.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 21. 
 51.  Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 257. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See Hate Crimes Statistics for 2018, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/civil-
rights/hate-crimes (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
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nothing at all, that “Religious heterosexism is generally nonviolent.”54 
I joked to a friend that this Paper may mark the first time I have had 
to type a “sigh” into an academic paper. Somehow, as I write these 
words, it no longer feels even remotely like a joking matter. 
Gay youth are disproportionately homeless, addicted, and truant 
or drop-out, and less likely to pursue higher education than their 
straight counterparts.55 The effects of a society in which gay people 
have long been and remain branded with a second-class status, 
recognized in law, are real—and the costs are not marginal. Too 
many allies, academic and otherwise, have the nasty habit of 
measuring progress by counting noses (there are more gays—
visibly—in places where we had never been before than ever 
before) without noticing whether the bodies to which those noses 
belong happen to be living or dead.56 The stigma we have borne as 
a legal underclass in this country has made the reality that I 
document here possible; it has provided the artificial nutrition and 
hydration to the monster that would, in fact, be better off dead. 
Koppelman seems determined to perpetuate that second-class 
standing in ways he considers insignificant because he is incapable 
of perceiving the risk. I have an existential duty to object. 
In what I have described as a meandering lecture, there is one 
bizarre meander that stands out for me—that “haunts” me may be 
a more accurate description. Professor Koppelman quotes a 
fundamentalist preacher named Russell Moore, who, according to 
Koppelman, has a nuanced and virtuous perspective on 
homosexuality.57 After committing to paper that Moore “opposes 
any antidiscrimination protection for gay people,”58 Koppelman 
then asks me—and any gay reader of his lecture—whether Moore 
is my enemy.59 I have admired Professor Koppelman’s scholarship 
and pro-gay commitments many times over more than two 
decades. But, if I am to be frank, this may be one of the most 
bewildering questions I’ve ever been asked to answer by an ally. 
Koppelman effectively wants to know whether a man who is 
vociferously committed to my second-class status (and to the 
	
 54.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 3. 
 55.  See Gilreath & Ward, supra note 2, at 256–57. 
 56.  GILREATH, supra note 45, at 28. 
 57.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 25–27. 
 58.  Id. at 26. 
 59.  Id. at 27. 
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second-class status of a gay community who generally do not have 
my advantages and protections of education, wealth, and position 
to shield them from harm), but who still possesses the most basic, 
meanest humanity as to not believe that gay children should be 
homeless or dead on account of their gayness is “really the 
enemy.”60 Really? 
CONCLUSION 
I grew up in the Bible belt of the rural South in an era when 
there was no same-sex marriage and in a state where same-sex sex 
between consenting adults in private was a felony carrying a 
lengthy prison term. Certainly, there were no state or local 
protections of any kind for gays and lesbians. My whole career has 
been spent in the representation and counsel of the LGBT 
community. Those I have represented and counseled have been 
abused, locked up, lighted on fire, even killed. This is the real 
world—the, to borrow from Andrea Dworkin, “real shit”61—where 
law professor hypotheticals do not come to play. These experiences 
don’t allow me the rhetorical luxury of questioning whether homo-
phobic religion is a root cause of this misery nor the patience to be 
grateful when one of its spokesmen is not as absolutely cruel as he 
otherwise could be. Naturally, I do not believe that any individual 
baker or florist is to blame for these miseries. But I am certainly not 
deluded enough to believe that individual acts do not have aggregate 
effects. A cultural context in which gays can successfully be branded 
“other,” often as a result of a root religious ethos, creates the 
environ-ment that makes what I have documented possible. 
Everything in life is part of it. Anti-gay stigma, usually couched as 
defensible religious morality, is unquestionably related to the very 
real physical perils still faced in this country by gays and lesbians. 
Everything has a context. And everything that goes into the 
making of that context is part of it, regardless of how insignificant 
it may seem to some people in isolation. And in this context, I can’t 
help but wonder what “safe” means to Koppelman when he writes 
that in addition to a world where it is safe to be gay, he’d “also like 
that regime to be one that’s safe for religious dissenters.”62 I can 
	
 60.  Id. 
 61.  ANDREA DWORKIN, LETTERS FROM A WAR ZONE 133 (1988). 
 62.  Koppelman Lecture, supra note 3, at 31. 
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only say that “safe” must have a vastly different substantive 
meaning for the two of us. 
I believe Professor Koppelman when he says he would “very 
much like to banish to the margins of society the notion that 
homosexual sex is inferior to heterosexual sex” and that he wants 
“gay people to suffer no disadvantage or humiliation whatsoever 
because there are other people who believe that nonsense.”63 I am 
glad he is an ally in this. But I can’t help wondering after reading 
this lecture whether his quotation of Churchill about the latter’s 
embrace of Stalin doesn’t put a fine point on the limitations of his 
advocacy. He quotes Churchill as saying, “I have only one purpose; 
the destruction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified thereby. If 
Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference to 
the Devil in the House of Commons.”64 Perhaps, Churchill’s alliance 
with Stalin was unavoidably necessary to achieve the salvation of 
Europe. Perhaps. But Koppelman’s advocacy of special discrim-
ination rights for homophobic religionists is not nearly so 
necessary. In any event, Churchill failed to grasp the whole story. 
He had not read Solzhenitsyn.65 Alas, Professor Koppelman seems 
to be missing a lot of the story, too. 
	  
	
 63.  Id. at 31. 
 64.  Id. at 27. 
 65.  ALEKSANDR I. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO: AN EXPERIMENT IN 
LITERARY INVESTIGATION (Thomas P. Whitney trans., 1975) (exposing the horrors of life 
under Stalin). 
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